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A fully stochastic approach to determine the lifetime and inspection
scheme of aircraft components
Frank Grooteman *
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Anthony Fokkerweg 2 1059 CM Amsterdam, The Netherlands
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Abstract
A fully stochastic fatigue life philosophy SLAP for aircraft components is presented. This approach covers the fatigue crack
initiation and growth periods in a realistic way, and avoids important disadvantages of the current deterministic Damage
Tolerance approach, which can be very conservative and yet does not give well-defined safety levels (Probability Of Failure).
SLAP gives more realistic predictions of component lifetimes and inspection schedules, whereby the required safety level
has a primary role in the determination of the inspection schedules. This is demonstrated by an example that uses in-service
inspection data for the upper longerons of the F-16 aircraft.
Keywords: Damage tolerance; Failure probability; Fatigue crack growth; Probabilistic fracture mechanics; Stochastic
analysis
Nomenclature
A2 Anderson-Darling test statistic
a crack length
ai initial crack length
ad deterministic detectable crack length
adet, apod stochastic detectable crack length
acr critical crack length
ninsp number of inspections
p probability value
pth threshold probability value
t life time
t0 Weibull location parameter
teconomic economic life time
tinitial time at initial inspection
∆trepeat repeat inspection interval
β Weibull shape parameter
η Weibull scale parameter
µ mean value
σ standard deviation
                                                     
* Tel.: +31-527-24-8727; fax.: +31-527-24-8210.
E-mail address: grooten@nlr.nl (Frank Grooteman).
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ADIS Adaptive Directional Importance Sampling
ASIP Aircraft Structural Integrity Programme
CAMS Core Automated Maintenance System
CSI Crack Severity Index
EIFS Equivalent Initial Flaw Size
FH Flight Hour
FORM First-Order Reliability Method
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, the Netherlands
POD Probability Of Detection
POF Probability Of Failure
RAP Reliability Analysis Program
RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force
SLAP Stochastic Life APproach
SORM Second-Order Reliability Method
1 Introduction
This paper considers a fully stochastic fatigue life philosophy, SLAP (Stochastic Life Approach), that offers an alternative
to the current deterministic and partially stochastic approaches used for fatigue lifing and inspection of military aircraft
components. Before presenting the SLAP philosophy, some background information is given about the current life
philosophies and issues related to deterministic and stochastic analysis in general.
1.1 Design Philosophies
Airworthiness regulations require proof that aircraft can be operated safely. This implies that critical components must be
replaced or repaired before safe operation can no longer be guaranteed. Different approaches can be followed to prove that a
component is safe. For military aircraft the approach followed depends on the customer requirements, the type of component
and the possibilities for inspection during service. The fatigue philosophies underlying the approaches for guaranteeing safety
are called Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance.
The Safe-Life philosophy is based on the concept that significant damage, i.e. fatigue cracking, will not develop during
the service life of a component. The actual life for which this is "true" is calculated and then checked by a suitable test
programme. Then the design safe-life is obtained by factoring the determined life by an appropriate safety factor. When the
service life equals the design safe-life the component has to be replaced. The US Navy and US Army, for example, apply this
philosophy. However, there is a major drawback, since components are taken out of service when they may still have
substantial remaining lives. Also, despite all precautions, it is still possible for cracks to occur prematurely, and this fact has
led the US Air Force to introduce the Damage Tolerance philosophy [1].
The Damage Tolerance philosophy not only recognises that damage can occur and develop during the service life of a
component, but it also stipulates that the possibility of cracks or flaws in a new structure should be accounted for. Safety is
incorporated into this approach by the requirements either that (1) any damage be detected by routine inspection before it
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results in a dangerous reduction of the static strength (inspectable components), or (2) the damage shall not grow to a
dangerous size during the service life (non-inspectable components).
Two requirements are necessary for this approach to be successful. First, it must be possible to define either a minimum
crack length ad that will not go undetected during routine inspections, or else an initial crack length ai based on pre-service
inspection. Second, one should be able to predict the growth of such cracks during the time until the next inspection or until
the design service life is reached. The result of a Damage Tolerance analysis is a curve presenting the crack length as
function of the number of cycles, starting from the initial crack length ai up to the critical crack length acr. (When a
component is not safety-critical a similar analysis can be done with a significantly smaller initial crack length. This is called a
Durability analysis, which is directed to assessing the economic life of a component. The US Air Force makes use of both
Damage Tolerance and Durability analyses.)
1.2 Deterministic Analysis
Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance analyses are basically deterministic. This means that the actual variability of the
parameters used in the analyses are not considered. Instead, scatter and safety factors are used to account for the variability in
material properties, service loads, fatigue test results, etceteras. For material parameters conservative lower bound values are
often used, such as the A- and B-values, which represent the 95% confidence lower limits on the first and tenth percentiles of
the property distributions [2]. Then a scatter factor of 1.5 is usually put on the limit load. Finally, a safety factor of two or
four is often applied to the obtained fatigue crack growth life or fatigue lifetime, respectively. In general, the results of such
analyses will be overly conservative life estimates and inspection intervals. Even so, the reliability (safety level) of the
structural design is not properly known. Moreover, the safety factors applied are quite arbitrary, although historically
successful probably because of the high degree of conservatism [3].
Other disadvantages of deterministic approaches are:
• The demand for lighter and more efficient structures can lead to the introduction of new materials and design
methodologies that would require different safety factors.
• Once a deterministic analysis has been done, the result is often compared with test data. However, the outcome is
questionable, most certainly when the data are limited and have significant scatter. In such cases a correlation between the
analysis and test data can be a coincidence. The only correct approach is to perform a stochastic analysis and compare the
results with the test data.
• Application of safety factors afterwards might even lead to unconservative results. For example taking into account
scatter in non-linear systems can have a considerable effect on the outcome of the model. The sensitivity of such systems for
even slight changes in the input parameters is a well-known phenomenon. A correction afterwards on a deterministically
obtained result might therefore result in an unsafe design. Non-linear models are more and more applied in the design stage
of structures, due to increased computational power and availability of these numerical tools.
1.3 Stochastic Analysis
The disadvantages of deterministic approaches, mentioned in subsection 1.2, provide a strong case for using stochastic
analysis. Good stochastic tools are now available, but there is resistance to their use. One reason is unfamiliarity with the
subject. Another, often quoted, is the lack of data for generating proper distribution functions. However, this problem often
can be overcome by combining available data with engineering judgement and allocating the distribution type on the basis of
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the physics of a phenomenon and goodness-of-fit tests. Even so, experimental programmes should be set up and designed to
collect sufficient statistical data, which is still not common practice in fatigue engineering.
The following steps can be distinguished in any stochastic analysis:
• Choice of random variables and their distribution functions
• Choice of failure function
• Solution of the stochastic problem, requiring a stochastic method
• Interpretation of the results.
These steps will be outlined here, paying particular attention to fatigue analyses. More information is given in Grooteman
[4].
As mentioned above, it is often possible to assign distribution functions to the analysis parameters. A sensitivity analysis
can be used to determine whether a parameter, or combination of parameters, should be treated as stochastic variables. In
other words, does the variation in these parameters cause any significant scatter in the result? If not, these parameters can be
treated deterministically.
The choice of failure function(s) is in most cases straightforward, although a more or less continuous behaviour of this
function in the stochastic domain is preferred.
There exist numerous numerical techniques to solve stochastic problems Bjerager [5]. The most simple and well-known is
the Monte Carlo method, but it is not very efficient when dealing with small probabilities of failure (< 10-3), as for
engineering structures. More efficient methods, such as FORM, SORM and Importance Sampling methods, have been
developed in the past decades. There exist commercial tools (FPI, ST-ORM) or in-house developed tools that implement
several of these methods. At the NLR a stochastic tool has been implemented over the past seven years called RAP
(Reliability Analysis Program, Grooteman [6]) including methods as, FORM, SORM and several Importance Sampling
methods: radial based Monte-Carlo, Latin-Hypercube, Directional sampling, and Adaptive Directional Importance Sampling
(ADIS). The stochastic tools operate on top of any deterministic tool and need no modifications to do this: an interface
between the stochastic and deterministic tools is provided by the stochastic tool. The extra input compared to the
deterministic analysis consists of specification of the random variables and their distribution functions, specification of the
failure function(s) and selection of the stochastic method to be applied.
An important issue in interpretation of the results is determination of the allowed Probability Of Failure (POF). Table 1
[7] gives some target probability values for lifetimes, based on the relative costs of safety measures and the consequences of
failure. In general, the target lifetime POF will be about 10-3 for engineering problems. For military aircraft structures the
POF should be of the order of 10-7 per flight hour, i.e. approximately 10-3 for the lifetime, assuming 104 flight hours during a
lifetime.
2 Alternative Stochastic Life APproach (SLAP)
During development of the Damage Tolerance approach it was realised that defining an initial crack length ai that is based
on pre-service inspection would give very conservative results. This realisation led to the concept of Equivalent Initial Flaw
Sizes (EIFS) for making crack growth calculations from the start of service to failure. EIFS are substitutes for any real (and
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unknown) initial damage in the structure. The problem is that EIFS values and distributions are obtained by back-calculation
from cracks found, using macrocrack growth models. The macrocrack growth models are unable to describe the real
behaviour and size distributions of cracks that grow from any (small) initial damage. The resulting EIFS distribution
therefore lacks any relation with reality, and more important, cannot be verified afterwards.
Instead of starting the life analysis at the start of the service life, another approach is to start the analysis at the end of the
service life by constructing the failure distribution. This distribution (unlike to the EIFS distribution) can be verified
afterwards using inspection data that becomes available during the service life as will be demonstrated in this paper. In the
design stage this distribution will be unknown, but with a limited number of tests and experience from the past a conservative
lower bound can be generated (Appendix A). Based on this distribution a conservative estimate of the inspection scheme can
be obtained guaranteeing the required safety level.
In order to subsequently reduce the inspection effort, the obtained conservative failure distribution has to be updated
when service life information (failure and non-failure data) becomes available. Even before reaching the initial inspection the
current service lives of the various components can be used to obtain an improved estimate of the failure distribution and
subsequently the inspection scheme, thereby reducing the conservatism of the approach. In this way an adaptive scheme can
be constructed leading to a minimal inspection effort for the required safety level.
These considerations led to the following alternative fully stochastic life approach called SLAP (Stochastic Life
APproach). The approach, presented in Figs. 1–5, enables the lifetime and inspection scheme of a structural component to be
determined and covers both the crack initiation and growth periods realistically, i.e. without the need for EIFS values and
distributions. The approach consists of the following three steps:
1. Construct the failure distribution
2. Backward crack growth analyses
3. Forward crack growth analyses, including inspections.
The basic methodology pertaining to these steps will be discussed next. Section 3 of the paper gives more details,
discussing the approach for a realistic application.
Step 1: Construct the failure distribution
First, the failure distribution has to be obtained, e.g. by means of a Weibull analysis, see Fig. 1. The initial failure
distribution should be a conservative estimate (lower bound) based on a limited set of test data, and should be updated during
the lifetime of the component by service data (failures and non-failures) as they become available, to reduce conservatism.
This will be discussed in more detail in section 3 and Appendix A.
An important concept is that the scatter introduced by material properties, load spectrum, etc., is included, de facto, in this
one failure distribution, and therefore need not be characterised separately. Moreover, an estimate of the scatter present in the
components can be updated easily by using information from service. This is a very important advantage over using the
variability of all the analysis parameters, since this information is often hard to acquire, if at all. Furthermore, a limited
number of random variables is a very attractive concept, especially for engineering use.
-10-
NLR-TP-2004-131
Step 2: Backward crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and corresponding crack length distribution
a) Back-calculations are done starting from the failure distribution of the component. However, these back-calculations are
not extrapolated to time zero, as in the EIFS approach, but only until a detectable crack length has been reached, adet in Fig.
2: this is comparable to the first stage of back-calculation using the Damage Tolerance philosophy. The resulting distribution
(PDF-adet in Fig. 2) corresponds to an estimate of the distribution which describes the time it takes for cracks of length adet to
become present in a certain percentage of the components. N.B.: the individual back-calculations are deterministic, since all
the variability is included in the failure distribution. The choice of adet will be addressed in subsection 3.4.
b) When a certain threshold percentage (pth, e.g. 1 %, Fig. 3) of these detectable cracks becomes present, the initial
(threshold) inspection becomes timely. An inspection before pth is unfeasible, since any cracks would be difficult to find with
a reasonable chance of detection. Determining the initial inspection tinitial in this way results in a realistically conservative
estimate that automatically covers the crack initiation, micro- and short-crack periods, without the need to model them. This
is a great advantage, since there are no well-established engineering models for fatigue crack initiation and microcrack
growth, and even the modelling of short crack growth in real structures is also problematical. (N.B.: short crack models are
not required because current in-service inspection techniques cannot detect cracks reliably at sizes below 1-2 mm, which is
beyond the short crack regime.)
c) The crack length distribution function (PDF-tinitial in Fig. 4) at tinitial can be obtained at the same time as in b), by
extrapolating all the back-calculations down to tinitial. As before, there is no need for crack initiation and micro- and short-
crack growth models. For short cracks this might not be completely true when considering the lower tail of the PDF-tinitial
distribution. However, this part of the PDF will not contribute to the probability of failure, discussed in the next step, and is
therefore irrelevant here.
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections
In the third and last step a stochastic forward crack growth analysis is performed, starting from the time tinitial and the
crack distribution (PDF-tinitial in Fig. 5). During this analysis a repeat inspection scheme (denoted by the crosses in the figure
for two example crack growth curves) is simulated by using the Probability Of Detection (POD) function appropriate to the
applied inspection method (see subsection 3.3 for details on the POD). As before, the individual crack growth calculations
are deterministic.
Once a crack has been "found" by a crack growth analysis, the component is assumed to be replaced (or repaired). There
will then be another period tinitial in which a new crack will initiate and grow. Starting from the end of this period, a crack
growth analysis can be done using a new crack length value drawn from the crack length distribution function (PDF-tinitial).
However, it can often be assumed that a replaced or repaired component will survive until the economic life of the overall
structure is reached, since this will normally be less than twice the crack initiation period.
Each crack growth calculation stops when the component has failed, when cracks have been shown to be non-detectable
by all inspections, or when the economic lifetime of the component has been reached, depicted by teconomic in Fig. 5.
Performing many of these crack growth calculations (of which two examples are shown in Fig. 5) finally results in a
Probability Of Failure (POF) value, with the number of calculations depending on the stochastic method applied. This POF
value can be compared with the required safety level, and if unsatisfactory the calculations can be redone with different
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repeat inspection schemes. Similarly, POF values can be obtained for different inspection methods and repeat inspection
schemes until the required safety level is attained. Also, one can choose between fixed-interval or variable-interval repeat
inspection schemes. If necessary, all these possibilities can be investigated in order to determine an optimum inspection
scheme. The choice of the repeat inspection interval is addressed in subsection 3.4.
3 First application of SLAP
3.1 Introduction
The first use of the SLAP approach has been for the Upper Longerons of the F-16s used by the Royal Netherlands Air
Force (RNLAF). The longerons are 2024-T62 aluminium tee-extrusions that distribute flight loads from the fuselage upper
skin to the centre-fuselage section. High positive g-loads can, and do, cause fatigue cracking in the longeron tab radii, see
Fig. 6.
The longerons are airframe inspection points (there are others) for the F-16 Aircraft Structural Integrity Programme
(ASIP). When cracks are detected during inspections, their lengths are registered in the Core Automated Maintenance
System (CAMS) database. Many inspection data are available, making the longerons ideal candidates for demonstrating the
SLAP approach.
3.2 Conventional deterministic analysis
The conventional deterministic procedure for determining the initial and repeat inspection scheme is shown schematically
in Fig. 7. Since the longerons are not safety-critical, a Durability analysis was done, starting from a 0.007 in. corner crack
and ending at the “functional impairment” crack length of 0.187 in. The crack growth curve was obtained from a Lockheed
Martin model validated with data from a test aircraft [8] and applied to a measured load spectrum representing the average
usage of RNLAF F-16s. The resulting baseline crack growth curve is given in Fig. 8. Assuming that the 90/95% reliably
detectable crack length ad was 0.1 in. for the manual eddy current inspection technique used on the longerons, application of
the procedure shown in Fig. 7 to the crack growth curve in Fig. 8 led to the following inspection scheme with unknown
safety level:
Initial inspection 2655 FH
Repeat inspection    62 FH
3.3 Probability of detection
In the previous subsection the reliably detectable crack length ad was assumed to be 0.1 in. However, if sufficient hit/miss
service inspection data are available, a Probability Of Detection (POD) curve can be constructed. This curve represents a
cumulative distribution function giving the chances of detecting cracks of different lengths. There were enough service
inspection data for the longerons, and the following procedure was used:
• Using the Lockheed Martin crack growth model [8], back-calculate the crack growth curve for each detected crack,
thereby obtaining estimates of the missed crack lengths during previous inspections. Since the load spectrum of each
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individual aircraft is tracked, resulting in a CSI (Crack Severity Index) value representing a measure of the severity of the
load spectrum, this information is used to improve the individual crack growth curves.
• Choose the most appropriate distribution function for the POD curve (log-normal, Fahr [9] and [10])
• The mean and variance of the chosen distribution are determined with the Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE)
method (Appendix A, equation 3), with F(t) equal to Pi representing the probability of detecting a crack of length ai ; (1- Pi)
is the probability of not detecting a crack of length ai ; n is the number of hits and N-n the number of misses.
The total data set consisted of 24 hits (in-service detection) and 121 misses (estimates of non-detection), and resulted in
an MLE fit having a mean µ = 0.0528 in. and variance σ = 0.0254 in. for the log-normal POD function. Fig. 9 shows the
mean POD curve i.e. the curve for 50% confidence, that was obtained using this data set. More details about construction of
this POD function are given in Heida [11].
It is important to note here that the alternative stochastic life approach SLAP, presented in the next section, uses the entire
POD curve to derive initial and repeat inspection schemes, and not just the single valued 90/95% ad in a conventional
deterministic analysis.
3.4 Application of SLAP
This section presents the results obtained with the alternative stochastic life approach SLAP, according to the method
described in section 2. The approach was implemented at the NLR in a computer code.
Step 1: Construct the failure distribution: Weibull analysis
The first step is determination of the failure distribution by means of a Weibull analysis (see Appendix A and Dodson
[12] for details). No test data were available for the longerons, but there were sufficient in-service inspection data to enable
demonstrating the use of SLAP. Since the detected cracks were smaller than the functional impairment crack length of 0.187
in., the failure times had to be estimated by crack growth analyses starting from the detected crack lengths up to functional
impairment. This was done using the CSI corrected Lockheed Martin crack growth model [8], as before.
The failure data were sufficient to obtain a reliable failure distribution without the addition of non-failure data (current
accumulated flight hours for uncracked longerons). Fig. 10 shows the results on Weibull probability paper, which ensures a
straight line for any Weibull cumulative distribution function. The straight line is the MLE fit, whose coefficients are given
in the diagram. These coefficients have the following meanings (see also Appendices A and B):
• The location parameter t0 represents the life (2624 FH) below which no failures are to be expected.
• The sum of t0 and the scale parameter η represents the life (3072 FH) when 63.2% of the longerons will have been
functionally impaired.
• The shape parameter β represents the rapidity of the failure process. The value of 2.57 indicates a mild failure mechanism
• A² is the test statistic value for the Anderson-Darling test. This is a goodness-of-fit test especially sensitive to deviations
in the distribution tails, which are important for the SLAP analysis. The A² value of 0.315 indicates a very good fit, see
Appendix B.
• The 95% confidence limits for the distribution parameters are:
t0: 2297 <4
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η: 380
β: 1.85
These confidence bounds are relatively small due to the sufficiency of data. The mean values of the parameters are used
for the crack growth analyses, since these values are the most representative. To ensure a conservative estimate of the failure
distribution, the lower bound value for the location t0 and scale parameter η and the upper bound value for the shape
parameter β can be selected instead.
Step 2: Backward crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and corresponding crack length distribution
It was shown in section 2 that the back-calculations are controlled by two parameters, the detectable crack length adet and
a threshold percentage of detectable cracks pth. For the present calculations the value of pth is set to 0.1 %, which is
sufficiently low. This enables a straightforward study of the influence of a range of adet values on the initial inspection time.
As mentioned before, the scatter introduced by material properties, load spectrum, etc., is included in the Weibull failure
distribution. However, to do the back-calculations an approximation must be made: namely, the shape of the deterministic
mean crack growth curve is used for all the calculations, since the real crack growth curves are unknown. This is incorrect,
since the crack growth curves for shorter lives generally will be steeper than the mean curve, and for longer lives will be
shallower. In turn, this means that the estimated crack lengths will be too large for the shorter lives and too small for the
longer lives. There is then the following dichotomy:
• Since the probability of failure (POF) is determined mainly by the below-mean part and lower tail of the failure
distribution, use of the mean curve overestimates the crack length, which is conservative
• On the other hand, the chance of detection, defined by the POD, will be unconservative because the "real" crack length
will be smaller.
Whether these two aspects will always combine to give a conservative estimate has yet to be examined, and will not be
dealt with in this first application of SLAP. However, as already mentioned one can ensure a conservative estimate by
selecting the lower limit values of t0 and η and the upper limit for β.
Fig. 11 gives an example of the back-calculation results, for one adet value. For clarity, only the 1%, 50% (mean) and 99%
crack growth curves are shown. The intersection of the PDF-adet distribution and the PDF-tinitial distribution occurs for a
threshold percentage pth of 0.1%, as specified, and corresponds to an initial inspection tinitial at 2293 FH.
Finally, Fig. 12 shows how the initial inspection time depends on varying adet from 0.02 - 0.14 in., which is almost the
entire range covered by the POD in Fig. 9. Choosing smaller detectable crack lengths for the back-calculations has the
hypothetical effect of reducing the initial inspection time, as can be understood from Fig. 11. For practical purposes this
should be interpreted as follows: given a particular inspection method, earlier inspections will indeed find some smaller
cracks, but with increasingly less reliability (POD). There will, in fact, be an optimum initial inspection time that minimises
the total number of inspections, discussed in step 3.
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections
-14-
NLR-TP-2004-131
In this final step the stochastic forward crack growth analysis is done, starting from the time tinitial (which depends on the
choice of adet, see Fig. 12) and the crack distribution PDF-tinitial, illustrated in Fig. 11. The PDF-tinitial is the only independent
random variable in these analyses, since tinitial and adet are interrelated. The result of the upward stochastic analysis is, of
course, again the failure distribution. However, in this step the inspection scheme is simulated.
The analyses were done for detectable crack lengths adet in the range 0.02 - 0.14 in., as before, and for various numbers of
repeat inspections (i.e. repeat inspection interval lengths). For each repeat inspection a detectable crack length apod was drawn
randomly from the POD distribution. Once a crack was "found" (a ≥ apod) the component was assumed to be replaced (or
repaired). There was then another period tinitial (the same for each individual calculation) before the forward crack growth
analysis was continued. On the other hand, a crack could be missed during all the inspections, leading to component failure,
i.e. functional impairment. All analyses were stopped after 5310 simulated flight hours, which is the average life in the
conventional deterministic analysis, see Fig. 8. This enables a direct comparison of the stochastic and deterministic
approaches. In total, there were 100,000 calculations. The results are presented in Figs. 13 - 15.
Figs. 13 and 14 show that the required number of inspections and the POF reach minimum, i.e. optimum, values for initial
inspection times corresponding to tinitial = 2150 - 2400 FH. In other words, the optimum initial inspection time is obtained
when the in-service detectable crack length adet is about 0.06 in. (see Fig. 12). This value of adet is the 69/50% percentile of
the POD function, see Fig. 9, which is much different from ad the 90/95% percentile specified for the in-service reliably
detectable crack length in a deterministic analysis [1]. Hence the stochastic analysis shows that it is more economical to
begin inspecting when the chance of detecting a crack is still fairly low – but not too low, as indicated in Figs. 13 and 14 by
upturns in the curves. The probability of failure subsequently will increase, since these cracks will be smaller and more
difficult to detect.
On the other hand more inspections during the economic life will be required to reach a certain safety level when the
initial inspection time is postponed too long. This is because cracks are growing faster and less time is available to detect
them requiring a shorter repeat inspection interval. Therefore an optimal initial inspection time tinitial, with a corresponding
detectable crack length adet, exists for minimising the total number of inspections ninsp.
Fig. 15 is an illustration of the most important results obtainable from the SLAP approach. This Fig. shows curves of
equal safety level as functions of the initial inspection time and total number of inspections, whereby fixed-interval repeat
inspections were specified. In this case the repeat inspection interval is given by
insp
initialeconomic
repeat n
ttt −=∆ (1)
with teconomic equal to 5310 FH and tinitial and ninsp obtained from Fig. 15.
The optimum inspection schemes for different POF values are marked by dots in Fig. 15, and all the values are given in
table 2.
The final issue to be dealt with is selection of the appropriate POF. As mentioned in subsection 1.3, the POF for the
lifetime safety of military aircraft structures should be about 10-3. However, the longerons are not safety-critical, and so it is
possible to select a higher POF value, say 10-2. This results in the following inspection scheme:
Initial inspection 2350 FH
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Repeat inspection  215 FH
Table 2 compares the SLAP values of initial inspection times, repeat inspection intervals and total number of inspections,
as functions of the POF, with the deterministic values from subsection 3.2; and also the detectable crack lengths. Relatively
speaking, the SLAP analyses resulted in slightly earlier initial inspections, but much-increased repeat inspection intervals and
hence a greatly reduced number of inspections during the lifetime. This can also be seen in Fig. 15 by the location of the star
representing the deterministic result.
In practical terms, SLAP shows it is possible to greatly reduce the inspection costs while maintaining a required reliability
level (POF). An slightly better inspection scheme might be found by allowing for variable-interval repeat inspections, which,
however, is often impractical.
4 Concluding remarks
An alternative and fully stochastic fatigue life philosophy SLAP (Stochastic Life APproach) has been presented, and
demonstrated by an example based on in-service inspection of the Upper Longerons of F-16 aircraft from the Royal
Netherlands Air Force. This approach covers both the fatigue initiation and crack growth periods in a realistic way, and can
serve as an alternative to the deterministic Damage Tolerance and Safe-Life approach. This may be concluded from the
example results, since well-grounded predictions of the lifetime and inspection scheme were obtained that differed
significantly from the deterministic ones and demonstrated the excessive conservatism of the Damage Tolerance approach.
Advantages of SLAP:
• A unified approach covering the whole fatigue lifetime, including crack initiation, micro-, short- and long-crack growth
periods.
• No initiation, micro- and short-crack models are required. This is a great advantage, since there are no well-established
engineering models for fatigue crack initiation and microcrack growth, and short-crack growth modelling for real structures
is questionable in its validity.
• Fully stochastic, introducing the concept of reliability-based design. This is becoming increasingly important, since the
continuing optimisation of aircraft structures will make them less reliable if historically-based scatter and safety factors are
used.
• Only a very limited number of random variables are introduced. In principal, all the scatter in the structure is covered by
the failure distribution, which can be conservatively determined from a limited number of tests (preferably done with realistic
load sequences) and improved by in-service data. In addition, a POD distribution (of which a lower bound can be obtained
from Rummel [13] is needed to simulate inspections.
• The methodology is reasonably straightforward and can be easily applied in an engineering environment based on the
same deterministic Damage Tolerance tool as currently used. This is an important prerequisite to become accepted.
• The approach fits in very well with the current inspection philosophy applied by military and civil operators, and in more
recent Prognostic Health Management (PHM) systems.
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Issues needing to be explored and resolved:
• The validity of SLAP needs to be more widely demonstrated. This includes more realistic fatigue testing, preferably on
components rather than coupons. This type of testing is much more costly, but coupon tests are anyway of questionable
value, whichever the approach.
• A minimum number of fatigue tests needs to be established, e.g. by reliability testing.
• It must be shown that the failure distribution that acts as the starting point for the SLAP approach is always conservative
(see Appendix A). The failure distribution should be updated during the service lives of the components: this should be
explicitly demonstrated.
• It must be shown that the use of the mean crack growth curve in the back calculation leads to conservative results.
• It should be examined whether scatter in the critical crack acr length should be taken into account. This is not expected to
be the case, since the influence on the life and thus POF is normally very small.
• Examine the feasibility and necessity of including separate “rogue flaws”. This might be done by means of a predefined
chance of occurrence that can be readily integrated with the stochastic process.
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Table 1
Lifetime probability of failure (POF) targets according to ISO 2394, [7]
Consequences of failureRelative costs of safety
measures Small Some Moderate Great
0 10-1 10-2 10-3
Moderate 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4
10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5
Table 2
Comparison of SLAP and deterministic results
Deterministic Stochastic
adet (in.)
POF
tinitial (FH)
∆trepeat (FH)
ninsp
0.1
Unknown
2655
62
43
0.06
10-3
2300
158
19
0.06
5*10-3
2330
188
15
0.06
10-2
2350
215
14
0.06
5*10-2
2400
323
9
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Appendix A Weibull Analysis
A.1 Introduction
A failure distribution function can be determined from experimental data provided there is a sufficient number of failure
points. Since the failure probability will be largely determined by the lower tail of the failure distribution, one might think
that a large number of tests are required to determine the distribution function's lower tail. However, if a lower bound for the
failure distribution can be found, via a limited number of tests, this would be initially acceptable. Then the design can be
based on the lower bound of the distribution function, which would be conservative, and in-service data gathered during the
lifetime of the component can be used to update and improve the estimate of the real failure distribution.
In-service inspections provide non-failure and failure data, both of which are used to improve the estimated failure
distribution, as discussed below. The non-failure data consist only of usage times at the moment of inspection, while failure
data will consist of the inspection times and detected crack lengths. These latter data are not actual failures, but extrapolation
using a verified fatigue crack growth model enables obtaining a realistic failure time.
The Weibull analysis method (Dodson [12]) is very suitable in this respect, for the following reasons:
• The Weibull distribution function plays an important role in failure analysis and is often the most suitable distribution to
describe a failure mode.
• An initial conservative lower bound estimate of the real failure distribution can be obtained with only a few failures
(Chapter 2, Dodson [12]). If even only non-failure data are available, an initial conservative lower bound of the real failure
distribution can be determined by means of a Weibayes or Weibest analysis.
A.2 Parameter estimation
Mathematically the Weibull distribution function is defined as:
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where
t = time to failure
t0 = location parameter
η = scale parameter
β = shape parameter
F(t) is the so-called cumulative distribution function and f(t) the probability density function obtained by differentiating
F(t):
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F(t) represents the fraction of components that has failed at time t, which can also be expressed as R(t) = 1 - F(t) called the
reliability, being the fraction that has survived at time t ; the location parameter t0 represents the starting point of the
distribution (no failures are present before this time) and can be set to zero in many cases; the scale parameter η is a measure
of the characteristic life of the component and represents the time when 63.2% of the components have failed; finally, the
shape parameter β is a measure of the speed of the failure mechanism and normally lies in the range of 2 to 6.
A value of β larger than 1 denotes a wearout failure mode, and a value of 4 or higher denotes a very fast failure
mechanism (rapid wearout). A value of β equal to 1 indicates a constant failure rate, which is independent of the elapsed
time, i.e. the failures are random and lack memory of the past. A value of β less than 1 denotes a decreasing failure rate, i.e.
an increasing reliability as the component ages: this is referred to as infant mortality rate.
The unknown values of the parameters t0, β and η are determined from a set of available data points, which may consist
of a mix of failed and non-failed sample times, so-called multiple censored data. Various methods exist to fit these three
parameters, of which the method of maximum likelihood is the preferred one. This method is based on a so-called likelihood
function L, describing the probability of obtaining the observed data and able to handle multiple censored data:
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where:
n = number of failed samples
N = total number of samples
F(t) and f(t) are respectively the cumulative distribution function and probability density function, which are given by
equations A.1 and A.2 in the case of the Weibull distribution function.
The three parameters t0, β and η are now found by maximising the likelihood function (A.3). This is done by
differentiating the log-normal of equation A.3 with respect to t0, β and η and equating the result to zero, resulting in
equations A.4, A.5 and A.6:
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The values of t0, β and η, (determined iteratively from equations A.4, A.5 and A.6), are only estimates of the real values, and
are therefore denoted by the symbol ^. Obviously, the more failure and non-failure data that are available, the better the
estimates will be. A so-called confidence interval can be determined (Dodson [12]) which contains the true values of these
parameters. To ensure a conservative estimate of the failure distribution, the lower bound value for the location t0 and scale
parameter η can be selected and the upper bound value for the shape parameter β .
Even if only non-failure data are available, an estimate of the parameters can be made. A value for β is assumed that is
based on historical failure data of similar components, or else engineering judgement. A lower confidence bound of 63.2%
for η can be found by setting n equal to 1 in equation A.6. This resembles the situation where the first failure is assumed to
be imminent and is called the Weibayes method: assuming that the first failure is imminent is often very conservative. A less
conservative approach is to select n=0.693, resulting in a 50% lower confidence bound with respect to the true Weibull
failure distribution, the so-called Weibest method. For more details see Dodson [12].
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Appendix B Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test
There are many goodness-of-fit tests, for example Komolgorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, Shipiro-Wilk. The
Anderson-Darling test is more sensitive to deviations in the tails of a distribution than the older Komolgorov-Smirnov test,
and can be applied to any distribution. These tests do not tell you that you do have a certain type of distribution function, they
only tell you when the data make it (un)likely that you do.
The Anderson-Darling test statistic value is determined by:
     ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) nn/xFlnxFlniA n
i
ini −


−+−−= ∑
=
−+
1
1
2 112 (B.1)
where F( ) is the cumulative distribution function and n the number of observations. The result from equation B.1 needs to be
modified for small sampling values. For the Weibull distribution the modification of A² is:
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The A² value must then be compared with the following critical values, which depend on the significance level α . The
determined A² value has to be less than the critical value, at any chosen significance level, for acceptance of goodness-of-fit:
